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The aim of this research is to examine the impact of three audit committee characteristics on 
corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) disclosure: the existence of an audit 
committee, audit committee independence, and audit committee financial expertise. Moreover, 
this research analyzes the moderating effect of board gender diversity between these audit 
committees’ attributes and CSR reporting. The results of analyzing 13,178 firm-year 
observations of non-financial companies show that the presence of an audit committee and audit 
committee financial expertise are positively associated with CSR disclosure. However, a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors in audit committees has a negative effect on the disclosure 
of CSR information. These findings suggest that some audit committees’ features play an 
important role in ensuring the reporting of environmental, social, and economic information. 
Our evidence also indicates that the presence of female directors on boards increases the 
positive impact of financial expert membership of audit committees on CSR disclosure, while 
women directors moderate any negative effect of the percentage of independent directors on 
audit committees on CSR reporting by increasing the latter. In addition, female directors 
moderate the positive impact of the existence of an audit committee on the disclosure of CSR 
information by reducing the latter. 
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A worldwide crisis and significant corporate scandals have affected perceptions of the 
honesty and trustworthiness of managers and the corporate governance system. This has led to 
increased scrutiny of companies and, thus, greater shareholder demands for better financial, 
social, and environmental information, and better quality financial statements (Young and 
Marais, 2012). Today, companies demonstrate interest in both financial performance and social 
and economic performance.  
In this sense, corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR) activities have 
become a relevant issue for regulators, investors, stakeholders, and scholars. Previous literature 
has examined the association between CSR disclosure and some features of the corporate 
governance field, such as long-term competitive financial returns (Cucari et al., 2018); the 
assurance of a firm’s legitimacy and accountability to its stakeholders (Helfaya and Moussa, 
2017); the increase in the quality of environmental disclosure (Iatridis, 2013); and the 
improvement of corporate efficiency (Xie et al., 2019), among others. CSR is viewed as a 
process in which firms disclose (voluntarily or mandatorily, depending on the country) social, 
environmental, and economic information to investors, stakeholders, and society (Dahlsrud, 
2008). One benefit of CSR reporting for firms is the enhancement of their reputation (Sun and 
Cui, 2014; Martinez-Ferrero et al., 2018), because these disclosures contribute to a better 
society and a cleaner environment. CSR disclosure provides more information (financial and 
non-financial) to stakeholders (Hackston and Milne, 1996), which helps them to make 
investment and non-investment decisions (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). In this regard, CSR 
has become a central part of corporate governance as an element of both moral and economic 
value (Cucari et al., 2018), which explains why CSR is considered a strategic decision in firms 
(Clarke, 2007).  
Companies tend to comply with the requirements, regulations, and codes of good 
governance concerning the disclosure of CSR information. However, the legal system may 
generate a coercive pressure on companies (Barakat et al., 2015), especially when this system 
is weak. In this sense, pressures from powerful stakeholders, rather than efficient incentives, 
may be the drivers of CSR disclosure (Khan et al., 2013). Furthermore, companies may have 
opportunistic managers whose objective is to use CSR information for their own personal 
benefit. In this case, companies may establish other internal or external control mechanisms, 
such as audit committees or auditors, to ensure the rights of stakeholders. Ali and Yusoff (2013) 
define audit committees as bodies established by boards of directors to review accounting and 
financial reporting processes and audit financial statements. Audit committees ensure the 
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integrity of financial reporting through their monitoring and control functions (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). The main functions of audit committees are to review financial affairs, 
to ensure the quality of information disclosed by the board, to solve board problems (Vinten 
and Connie, 1993), and to oversee the disclosure process in general. While there is no set size 
for an audit committee, it is typically made up of at least three people who should all, ideally, 
be independent. Maintaining independent audit committee members is crucial to ensuring 
effectiveness. It is imperative that audit committee members remain objective and function as 
arbitrators between management, external auditors, and stakeholders. Conversely, the finance 
function of an audit committee produces reliable and auditable information for external 
disclosure. The strength of the finance function is therefore critical in supporting the oversight 
role of the audit committee, which can be severely inhibited by a weak finance function lacking 
capacity or expertise. In this regard, the existence of an audit committee, its independence, and 
its financial expertise may be useful mechanisms that affect CSR reporting.  
Thus, we aim to answer three research questions: (1) Is the presence of an audit 
committee associated with CSR reporting? (2) How does audit committee financial expertise 
impact CSR disclosure? (3) How does the proportion of non-executive directors on audit 
committees affect CSR reporting? We also explore the moderating effect of board gender 
diversity on the three key variables of our research: the existence of an audit committee, its 
independence and financial expertise, and CSR reporting. The study is based on data from the 
period 2005–2015, providing an opportunity to analyze the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on CSR disclosure, where the disclosure of non-financial information is 
considered a critical factor in the strategic policies of firms (Clarke, 2007). 
Our study makes several important contributions to the corporate governance literature, 
particularly to the audit committee field. First, we show that the existence of an audit committee 
in firms and audit committee financial expertise are positively associated with CSR disclosure, 
while non-executive directors on audit committees negatively affect the voluntary reporting of 
CSR information. The existence of an audit committee enhancing non-financial reporting 
quality, such as CSR reporting, and audit committee independence discouraging the disclosure 
of CSR information are not new phenomena; they have been analyzed previously, albeit rarely. 
However, this study provides a new research stream by demonstrating the positive effect of 
audit committee expertise on CSR reporting; to the best of our knowledge, this has not yet been 
examined. Thus, we contribute to the current body of literature on audit committees’ 
characteristics and CSR disclosure by providing new evidence of the positive effect of audit 
committee expertise on CSR reporting. Second, this research contributes to the current debate 
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about the compulsory presence of female directors on corporate boards. Previous research has 
explored how board gender diversity affects CSR reporting, but the moderating effect of female 
directors on boards on audit committee characteristics and CSR disclosure has not received 
attention by other researchers, as far as we know. Accordingly, our research addresses this gap 
in the literature by analyzing the moderating effect of board gender diversity on the attributes 
of audit committees and CSR reporting. In this regard, we find that the positive effect of the 
existence of an audit committee on CSR reporting is negatively moderated by female directors 
on boards, while the presence of women directors on boards reinforces the positive role played 
by financial experts on audit committees in CSR disclosure. Conversely, female directors on 
boards moderate the negative impact of non-executive directors on audit committees on the 
reporting of CSR information, because the interaction between women directors on boards and 
the proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees positively affects CSR 
disclosure. Thus, having female directors on boards benefits firms when their audit committees 
are composed of non-executive or independent directors and financial experts, because CSR 
reporting increases. In contrast, the mere presence of an audit committee discourages the 
disclosure of CSR information when boards consist of women directors. This may be because 
female directors consider that an audit committee per se is not a sufficiently efficient 
mechanism to enhance CSR reporting, and that it should be composed of independent and 
financial experts.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews past research and 
describes our hypotheses. Section 3 explains the data collection and methodology of this study. 
Section 4 presents the results and section 5 offers the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
From an agency perspective, it could be suggested that the divergent interests and 
information asymmetries between shareholders and managers appear in situations of separation 
between the ownership and management of firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This could have 
several consequences, such as conflict of interest due to moral hazards and adverse selection 
problems. This theory supports the argument that companies may use different methods (such 
as voluntary disclosure or audit committees) to reduce agency problems. One of the monitoring 
mechanisms of corporate governance used to improve the auditing and reporting quality of 
companies is the audit committee (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For this reason, audit committee 
characteristics (such as independence or expertise) are relevant factors in the corporate 
governance field; they enhance corporate reporting (Wiseman et al., 2012) by reducing the 
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opportunistic behavior of managers and mitigating agency problems (Madi et al., 2014). 
Therefore, audit committees become a mechanism of corporate governance for stakeholders to 
mitigate agency costs, align managers’ and stakeholders’ interests (Wiseman et al., 2012), and, 
ultimately, enhance the disclosure of environmental and social information. In this regard, CSR 
disclosure can benefit stakeholders by decreasing information asymmetries between managers 
and these stakeholders. Through the lens of an agency approach, audit committees are 
considered an internal monitoring mechanism that can mitigate agency problems and encourage 
the reporting of CSR information (Said et al., 2009). One role of audit committees is to ensure 
that companies assume the responsibility of CSR disclosure (Jamali et al., 2008; Kolk and 
Pinkse, 2010), because audit committees with adequate attributes can work as indicators of 
firms' quality control and CSR disclosure (Appuhami and Tashakor, 2017).  
Consistent with both agency and stakeholder theories, audit committees should commit 
companies to engaging in environmental and social behaviors in the interests of both 
stakeholders and society (Hill and Jones, 1992). From this point of view, audit committees 
should assume the responsibility of CSR disclosure because stakeholders will expect companies 
to be more transparent and engage in CSR activities. With the CSR information disclosed by 
firms, stakeholders can assess the reliability, legitimacy, and transparency of firms. A 
stakeholder approach suggests that firms should be responsible for all stakeholders for moral 
reasons (Culpan and Trussel, 2005). Further, this approach explains how an organization should 
interact with its stakeholders to comply with their different expectations (Deegan, 2006). 
Hence, managers and stakeholders should engage in a dialogue to fine-tune their priorities, 
including environmental and social information in this dialogue (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). 
According to stakeholder theory, several agents are interested in firms’ attitudes toward CSR 
issues (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013).  
 
2.1. The presence of audit committees 
Board committees support boards in executing their duties. The most important are 
audit, remuneration, executive, nomination, and CSR committees, among others. The audit 
committee is considered an effective tool within a strong corporate governance structure (Cohen 
et al., 2004; Kend, 2015). Past research has examined the role of audit committees in the 
improvement of corporate governance standards (Turley and Zaman, 2004, 2007). Audit 
committees act as delegate committees, undertaking specialized activities of the board and 
helping to ensure the performance of internal and external auditors (Priantana and Yustian, 
2011). An extensive range of studies provides evidence that audit committees enhance firm 
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performance (Weir et al., 2002), financial reporting quality (Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008), the 
appointment of high-quality auditors (Cho and Wu, 2014), and earnings management (Larcker 
et al., 2007), among others.  
From an agency perspective, it can be suggested that audit committees are internal 
governance mechanisms in firms that help to reduce agency problems between shareholders 
and managers and solve society's social problems through CSR disclosure (Said et al., 2009). 
In this context, Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) argue that an effective audit committee tends to 
disclose more CSR information to reduce agency problems and convince external users that 
managers act successfully in the interests of both society and the environment. Ika et al. (2017) 
provide evidence that the effectiveness of audit committees in the supervision of financial 
statements could improve the disclosure of social information. Stakeholder theory posits that 
audit committees are considered as delegate committees of corporate boards in charge of 
safeguarding the interests of stakeholders (Klein, 1998). Khan et al. (2013) find that the 
presence of an audit committee is positively associated with CSR disclosure. This finding is 
supported by the thesis that a particular role of audit committees should be to engage with 
stakeholder expectations.  
Audit committees are considered a key element of firms through which CSR orientation 
is implemented (Jamali et al., 2009; Appuhami and Tashakor, 2017). In this sense, Appuhami 
and Tashakor (2017) show that the existence of an audit committee (with suitable 
characteristics) is considered a signal of the quality of the internal monitoring function, as well 
as a relevant tool for establishing CSR activities. 
An increasing number of studies focus on issues associated with the existence of an 
audit committee and the disclosure of CSR information. In this regard, empirical evidence from 
diverse studies indicates a positive association between these two variables (Said et al., 2009; 
Suryono and Prastiwi, 2011; Tommy, 2015; Laksmi and Kamila, 2018). This suggests that the 
existence of an audit committee is likely to support the disclosure of CSR activities to improve 
relations with stakeholders and reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
This leads us to posit the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between the presence of an audit committee and 
CSR disclosure. 
 
2.2. Audit committee financial expertise  
Audit committee financial expertise is considered a valuable tool for companies. Iyer et 
al. (2013) define a financial expert on an audit committee as a director who has accounting, 
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auditing, and financial expertise. In this regard, directors who do not have accounting and 
financial expertise (sitting on audit committees) are less likely to detect problems in the 
reporting process. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) report that audit committee directors with financial 
expertise are essential for understanding the complexity of financial statements and for 
overseeing corporate reporting processes effectively.  
Past research provides evidence that audit committee members with financial expertise 
ensure financial reporting quality (Sun et al., 2014), improve the timeliness of financial 
information (Abernathy et al., 2014), improve CSR strategy (Shaukat et al., 2016), and enhance 
earnings quality (Chen and Komal, 2018) and audit quality (Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2017). 
Audit committee financial expertise could detect financial risks in both the short and long term, 
while avoiding environmental and social risks, which could have significant financial 
implications for firms (Musallam, 2018).  
There are limited studies examining the role of audit committee financial expertise in 
CSR reporting. Abernathy et al. (2014) provide evidence that audit committees with accounting 
financial expertise are more effective, because they provide financial information on time. 
Accordingly, Haji (2015) documents that audit committee financial expertise encourages 
companies to disclose non-financial information. Helfaya and Moussa (2017) show that audit 
committee directors with financial expertise tend to maintain a balance between a company’s 
financial and non-financial goals, while putting pressure on managers to respond to the premises 
of stakeholders related to environmental and social issues. Charir et al. (2018) report that audit 
committee financial expertise has a positive effect on carbon emission disclosure because of 
the ease with which carbon emission information can be reviewed and monitored.  
The presence of financial experts on audit committees can be essential for strategic 
decisions (such as CSR reporting), given their relevance in making important decisions and in 
avoiding and managing risks (Shaukat et al., 2016). Thus, financial experts on audit committees 
can mitigate agency problems related to the scant flow of information between parties (Bedard 
and Gendron, 2010), which may improve communication and information sharing between 
stakeholders and managers—particularly of CSR information. In line with agency theory, audit 
committees with financial expertise are able to enhance policies related to monitoring and 
organizational transparency and can help fulfil disclosure requirements (Van der Zahn and 
Cong, 2019). Based on the above arguments, we expect there to be a positive relationship 




Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between audit committee financial expertise and 
CSR disclosure. 
 
2.3. Proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees  
Audit committee independence is one of the most analyzed characteristics in previous 
research because it is considered an essential mechanism for monitoring corporate governance 
(Abbot et al., 2000). Most corporate governance codes from different countries—such as the 
Cadbury Report (1992), the Unified Code of Good Corporate Governance (2006, 2015), and 
the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (2006)—recommend that the majority of directors on 
audit committees should be independent. Based on agency theory, any disparities between the 
interests of owners and managers and information asymmetries can be reduced by independent 
audit committees. Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes-Barberá (2007) argue that audit 
committees composed exclusively of independent directors provide better transparency for 
companies. Carcello and Neal (2003) support the premise that outside directors on audit 
committees play an important monitoring role by reducing the expropriation of shareholder 
wealth (Fama, 1980) and by mitigating opportunities for management to act in their own 
personal interests (Allegrini and Greco, 2011). Further, Jensen (1993) argues that audit 
committee independence allows for the monitoring of managers’ actions to enhance CSR 
disclosure, therefore reducing information asymmetry and agency problems.  
Previous literature has examined the importance of audit committee independence in 
some fields of corporate governance, such as financial disclosure (Haldar and Raithatha, 2017), 
audit committee activity (Adelopo et al., 2012), intellectual capital disclosure (Haji, 2015), and 
firm performance (Kallamu and Saat, 2015). Empirically, the effect of audit committee 
independence on CSR disclosure is negative (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), because independent 
directors might play an ineffective monitoring role due to high workload, a lack of true 
independence, and scant industry knowledge (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Azlan Annuar, 
2012), in accordance with agency theory. In this sense, Ali et al. (2017) suggest that this 
negative impact on CSR disclosure might be due to a lack of knowledge about CSR issues, or 
because non-executive directors are not pressured by stakeholders on issues related to CSR 
disclosure. García-Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero (2017) highlight a negative effect of 
independent directors on CSR disclosure. These authors explore the moderating role of the 
benefits and costs of disclosure between independent directors and CSR reporting, 
demonstrating that the low cost of equity capital and high proprietary costs shield independent 
directors from disclosing more CSR information; that is, these benefits and costs may justify 
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the negative impact of independent directors on CSR reporting. Al-Jandadi et al. (2013) show 
that non-executive directors on audit committees do not affect voluntary disclosure of 
information because they have limited experience on these committees and consequently do not 
provide reporting quality.  
Based on the above arguments, a negative influence of non-executive directors on audit 
committees on CSR reporting is expected, because they are not specialized in CSR issues and 
their independence is not always real. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative association between the proportion of non-executive directors 
on audit committees and voluntary CSR disclosure. 
 
2.4. The moderating role of female directors on boards  
Audit committees are board sub-committees. Consequently, the presence of women on 
boards may provide important resources to audit committees, such as more information, more 
human capital, diverse opinions, perspectives, and sensitiveness, all of which might improve 
audit committee performance when taking decisions and preparing reports (Burke, 1997; Carter 
et al., 2003). In addition, Huse and Solberg (2006) argue that women are more engaged and 
involved with social and environmental issues than men, are more diligent, and, ultimately, 
create a positive environment for decision-making processes. Similarly, several studies have 
shown that women are less concerned with their personal interests, and can therefore improve 
the decision-making process and make it more effective (Coffey and Wang, 1998). Webb 
(2004) and Huse and Solberg (2006) also support the view that women directors are more 
sensitive to CSR matters. In this regard, Tingbani et al. (2020) show that board gender diversity 
has a positive effect on the voluntary reporting of information concerning greenhouse gas, 
which allows firms better to serve stakeholders' interest, gaining accordingly more confidence 
from not only shareholders, but also from all stakeholders. Furthermore, female representation 
on boards might enhance boards’ behavior and effectiveness (Webb, 2004; Huse and Solberg, 
2006). Thus, a greater presence of female directors can provide different points of view, 
experiences, work styles, and values. 
 Other studies suggest that female directors tend to ask questions more freely, which 
improves the effectiveness of communication among directors (e.g., Bilimoria and Wheeler, 
2000; Walt and Ingley, 2003). Gul et al. (2011) argue that board gender diversity increases the 
capacity of boards of directors and their committees to provide better oversight of disclosure 
and company reports. Previous studies conducted by Gul et al. (2011) and Huse and Solberg 
(2006), related to accounting and corporate governance issues, show that boards of directors 
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and audit committees with female directors have higher levels of debates and discussions about 
difficult issues. These matters often receive less attention when committees and boards consist 
only of men. These arguments suggest that the presence of women on boards might improve 
the effectiveness of the control and supervision of audit committees, and might support audit 
committees to encourage increased CSR disclosure. Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado (2019) argue 
that female directors in audit committees affect the quality of voluntary disclosure relative to 
environmental, social and governance issues.  
Previous management, psychology, and sociology literature also demonstrates that 
females are more risk averse and conservative than males (Byrnes et al., 1999; Man and Wong, 
2013). In this regard, some authors, such as Eweje and Brunton (2010), find that women present 
a more ethical opinion than males and, as a result, female directors are likely to be more capable 
of identifying unethical behaviors. Gul et al. (2007) argue that females not only show greater 
ethical behavior and risk aversion, but they also locate voluntary information more effectively, 
which might lead to reduced information asymmetries between female directors and managers. 
Both conservatism and risk aversion might improve the integrity of the financial reporting 
process, and the reporting process in general (such as CSR reporting) if there is female 
representation on boards and sub-committees.  
 The above arguments and evidence support the point that differences between female 
and male directors affect the conservatism, decision-making processes, and risk preferences of 
management within a company. In this regard, board gender diversity can have a moderating 
effect on the existence of an audit committee, its independence and financial expertise, and 
CSR disclosure. It can be said that board gender diversity can improve and promote 
transparency in the reporting of CSR information through firms’ audit committees, their 
independence, and financial expertise. Board gender diversity might reinforce the governance 
of firms and might lead to increased CSR reporting by encouraging audit committees with 
independent directors and financial experts to report more CSR issues.  
Therefore, the next hypothesis we propose is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of the existence of an audit committee, audit committee financial 
expertise, and the proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees on 








3. Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
The initial sample consisted of 14,036 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015 
(inclusive) collected from the Thomson Reuters database, which provides corporate 
governance, economic, and financial information. Financial entities were removed from the 
initial sample because these entities comply with specific accounting rules, which means it 
would have been more difficult to compare annual financial statements between non-financial 
and financial companies. Thus, the final sample used in this study consisted of 13,178 firm-
year observations from 36 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States). Table 1 presents the number of observations by 
country and their percentages across the total sample. The countries with the highest proportion 
of observations were the United States with 27.51%, followed by Japan with 13.58%, and the 
United Kingdom with 9.17%. The Czech Republic and Greece were the countries with the 
lowest representation in our sample with 0.06% and 0.08%, respectively.  
<Insert Table 1> 
In relation to sector classification, this study was divided into nine activity sectors in 
line with the Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC). As is evident from Table 2, 
the industrial sector represents 21.40%, followed by consumer cyclicals with 18.80%, and basic 
materials with 14.00%. Telecommunications services is the sector with the lowest 
representation with 4.00%. 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
3.2. Measure development 
The dependent variable was the reporting of CSR information, denoted by 
CSR_SCORE index. To measure the dependent variable, we built an index with 112 items 
concerning environmental and social issues, in line with the work of Sharma and Song (2018) 
and Hermawan and Gunardi (2019). Each item took the value 1 if the item considered was 
disclosed by the firm, or if it was not, it took the value of 0. The 112 items refer to the following 
seven categories of environmental and social information: (1) resource use, (2) emissions, (3) 
innovation, (4) workforce, (5) human rights, (6) community, and (7) product responsibility. 
This information was also collected from the Thomson Reuters database. Similarly, other 
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researchers have used several categories of items concerning social and environmental matters 
to construct their CSR indexes: Jizi et al. (2014) focus on four categories, Helfaya and Moussa 
(2017) on six, and Young and Marais (2012) on eight, among others. Table 3 presents all the 
items included in the construction of the CSR_SCORE index. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Our first independent variable was the existence of an audit committee, denoted by 
AUD_COMT, and measured as a dummy variable that scored 1 if the firm had an audit 
committee or 0 if it did not (Khan et al., 2013; Wang, 2016). Audit committee expertise 
(AUD_COMT_EXPERT) was another independent variable, and was calculated with a dummy 
variable that coded the value 1 if the audit committee of the firm had at least three members 
and at least one "financial expert" or 0 if it did not (Shaukat et al., 2016). Our final independent 
variable was the presence of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
(AUDI_COMT_NONEXE), which was measured as the proportion of independent members 
on audit committees, in line with the work of Haji (2015). The moderating variable (female 
directors on boards) was denoted by FEM_DIR_B and was measured as the ratio between the 
total number of female directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards (Atif et 
al., 2020).  
Concerning control variables, we controlled for firm size (SIZE), which was calculated 
as the log of total assets. Additionally, we considered return on assets (ROA), which was 
measured as the operating income before interest and taxes over total assets (Cordeiro et al., 
2020), as well as leverage (LEV), calculated as debt over total assets. We also controlled for 
board size, labeled B_SIZE, measured as the total number of directors on boards. The existence 
of a CSR committee (CSR_COMMITTEE) was calculated as a dummy variable, which took 
the value 1 if the company had a CSR committee and 0 if it did not. In addition, we controlled 
for the industry. Consistent with the work of Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-Custodio (2017), we 
considered the following nine sectors: basic materials (BASIC MATERIALS), consumer 
cyclical (CONSUMER CYCLICAL), consumer non-cyclical (CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL), energy (ENERGY), healthcare (HEALTHCARE), industrial (INDUSTRIALS), 
technology (TECHNOLOGY), telecommunications services (TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES), and utilities (UTILITIES), based on the TRBC economic classification. This 
variable, denoted by SECTOR, was calculated as a dummy variable with the value 1 if the 
company operated in this sector and 0 if it did not. Finally, the year (YEAR) was also controlled 
for by considering a set of dummy variables in the model. Table 4 presents the description of 
all variables used.  
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<Insert Table 4 > 
To check our hypotheses, the following model was estimated: 
 
CSR_SCORE = β0 + β1AUD_COMTit + β2AUD_COMT_EXPERTit + 
β3AUDI_COMT_NONEXEit + β4FEM_DIR_Bit + β5FEM_DIR_Bit x 
AUD_COMTit + β6 FEM_DIR_Bit x AUD_COMT_EXPERTit + 
β7FEM_DIR_Bit x AUDI_COMT_NONEXEit +β8SIZEit + β9ROAit + 
β10LEVit + β11B_SIZEit + β12CSR_COMMITTEEit + ∑j=1320 βjSECTORSit + 
∑ βk YEARt + ηi + µit 
 
The "i" and “t” subscripts represent the company and year, respectively. The coefficients 
of the regression are βi, and the random error term (Ԑit) is divided by µit, which varies among 
companies over time. The individual effect ηi, which characterizes each company, is invariant 
over time. 
To avoid endogeneity bias (Wintoki et al., 2012), which might provide incorrect 
estimates, we used the two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM estimator is 
more efficient and consistent than other procedures, because it controls for unobservable 
heterogeneity.  
The GMM technique provides the Wald χ2 test, the Arellano–Bond tests AR(1) and 
AR(2), and the Hansen test. The Wald χ2 test showed us the model fitness. The second-order 
serial correlation, exhibited by the test AR(2), demonstrated whether the second-order serial 
correlation in the first difference residual was a concern. The rejection (p > 0.1) of the null 
hypothesis of “non-serial correlation” allowed us to conclude that the second-order serial 
correlation was not a problem. Finally, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions showed 
whether the instruments employed in the model were the most appropriate by the rejection (p 
> 0.1) of the null hypothesis of non-correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 details descriptive data for the sample. The mean of the dependent variable was 
0.252. This score shows that the level of CSR information disclosed by firms in our sample was 
moderate. Further, 82.50% of firms in our sample had an audit committee (AUD_COMT). In 
72.00% of the audit committees there were at least three directors, of which at least one had 
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financial experience (AUD_COMT_EXPERT), whilst 92.17% of audit committee directors 
were non-executive (independent directors) (AUDI_COMT_NONEXE). On average, firm size 
was 9.64 (SIZE) and the return on assets was 6.44% (ROA), while the average leverage was 
68.87% (LEV). In addition, the average board size (B_SIZE) was 10 members and 58.07% of 
firms had a CSR committee (CSR_COMMITTEE). Concerning the variable industry, 14.00% 
of firms in the sample belonged to basic materials, 18.80% to consumer cyclicals, 9.90% to 
consumer non-cyclical, 8.66% to energy, 7.80% to healthcare, 21.40% to industrials, 7.80% to 
technology, 4.00% to telecommunications services, and 6.40% to utilities. Finally, the average 
proportion of female directors on corporate boards (the moderating variable) was 11.76%.  
<Insert Table 5> 
 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 6. According to this information, none of 
the coefficients was higher than 0.8, in line with the findings of Kennedy (2008). Therefore, we 
can conclude that there were no multi-collinearity concerns. 
<Insert Table 6> 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In Table 7, we show the three models built in which we explore how the existence of an 
audit committee, audit committee financial expertise, and the proportion of non-executive 
directors on audit committees affect CSR disclosure. Moreover, we built three further models 
to examine the moderating effect of female directors on boards on the existence of an audit 
committee, audit committee financial expertise, the proportion of non-executive directors on 
audit committees, and the reporting of CSR information.  
Model 1 presents the findings for the impact of the existence of an audit committee on 
CSR disclosure. The coefficient is positive, as predicted, and is statistically significant. Thus, 
the first hypothesis is supported, showing that the existence of an audit committee enhances 
CSR reporting, consistent with the results of Khan et al. (2013). Our evidence accords with the 
stakeholder approach, which suggests that companies implement corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as audit committees) as tools to respond to stakeholder expectations (Khan 
et al., 2013) and control the reporting process (Said et al., 2009; Suryono and Prastiwi, 2011; 
Tommy, 2015; Laksmi and Kamila, 2018). This evidence shows that audit committees 
complement the disclosure role of CSR committees, because audit committees also improve 
CSR reporting. Firms that have not established a CSR committee may encourage CSR 
disclosure if they have an audit committee. This evidence suggests that audit committees 
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supervise and enhance the financial reporting process as well as other reporting processes, such 
as CSR disclosure.  
In Model 2, we examine the association between audit committee financial expertise 
and CSR disclosure. The findings demonstrate that audit committee financial expertise has a 
positive effect on the reporting of CSR matters, and is significant, as predicted. This evidence 
supports hypothesis 2. It can therefore be concluded that audit committees with directors with 
financial experience tend to support greater reporting of CSR information, in line with the work 
of Helfaya and Moussa (2017). This finding suggests that audit committees consisting of 
directors with financial expertise seek balance between financial and non-financial goals and 
put pressure on managers to ensure that stakeholder concerns related to CSR activities are 
addressed (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Our evidence is also supported by Hillman et al. (2000, 
p. 241), who recommend the inclusion of specialists in corporate structures, namely, “directors 
who provide expertise and linkages in specific, identifiable areas that support the firm’s 
strategies.” Audit committees with directors with financial expertise seem to engage more with 
CSR issues and tend to attract environmental and social capital, which improves firms’ long-
term sustainability, for example, through CSR reporting (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017).  
In Model 3, we analyze how the proportion of non-executive (independent) directors on 
audit committees impacts CSR reporting. The coefficient, as predicted, is negative, and it is 
statistically significant. This evidence allows us to accept the third hypothesis. We demonstrate 
that a higher percentage of non-executive directors on audit committees discourages the 
reporting of CSR information, in line with the work of Haniffa and Cooke (2005). This finding 
may be because non-executive directors on audit committees are more likely to disregard the 
managers’ deficiencies and increase information asymmetries in relation to non-financial 
activities. In this regard, non-executive directors on audit committees will align with managers 
who are less concerned with environmental and social issues. This evidence indicates that non-
executive or independent directors are not as independent as might be expected. In addition, the 
lack of knowledge of non-executive directors on CSR matters might support this finding, or 
having many executive directors on an audit committee may limit the non-executive director’s 
decisions, which also shows a lack of real independence of these directors.  
In Models 4, 5, and 6, we explore the moderating effect of female directors on boards 
on the existence of an audit committee, its independence and financial expertise, and CSR 
disclosure. Model 4 shows the interaction between female directors on boards and the existence 
of an audit committee, which is negative and statistically significant. This leads us to partially 
accept the fourth hypothesis. This evidence suggests that female directors on boards negatively 
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moderate the positive effect of an audit committee on CSR disclosure. Specifically, female 
directors on boards do not support the decisions of audit committees to disclose more CSR 
information. Thus, the likelihood of reporting more CSR issues is lower when a firm has both 
an audit committee and female directors on boards. Both mechanisms (board gender diversity 
and audit committees) are more substitutive than complementary. Model 5 exhibits a positive 
interaction between female directors on boards and financial expertise on audit committees, and 
is statistically significant. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is also partially accepted. This 
finding suggests that women directors on boards reinforce the positive association between the 
financial expertise of audit committees and CSR reporting. Our result supports the premise that 
women directors on boards and audit committees with directors with financial expertise show 
greater commitment to the voluntary disclosure of CSR information. In this regard, companies 
with female directors on boards and audit committee directors with financial expertise have a 
higher probability of reporting more CSR information. Board gender diversity and audit 
committee directors with financial expertise are more complementary than substitutive. Thus, 
female directors on boards support audit committee decisions on CSR disclosure when audit 
committees have directors with financial expertise. This may be because these directors have 
financial knowledge and expertise and place more importance on the reporting process 
(including CSR reporting), whilst female directors rely on the CSR decisions of financial 
experts on audit committees. Finally, in Model 6, we analyze the moderating effect of women 
directors on boards between the proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees and 
CSR disclosure. The effect is positive and significant. Accordingly, in this case, the fourth 
hypothesis is also accepted. This evidence indicates that the presence of women directors on 
boards positively moderates the negative impact of non-executive directors on audit committees 
on CSR reporting. This indicates that firms with independent audit committees should establish 
boards with female directors because they compensate for the discouragement of CSR 
disclosure by independent directors on audit committees. It can be said that female directors on 
boards and independent directors on audit committees are substitute mechanisms. This analysis 
clearly provides results in line with agency theory. These results confirm that firms do not 
behave in a similar way regarding CSR reporting when there are female directors on boards. 
Additionally, our evidence also shows that when firms have audit committees with independent 
directors and directors with financial expertise, their moderating role is different.  
Regarding the control variables, the variable firm size (SIZE) only exhibits a negative 
sign in Model 1, while board size (B_SIZE) presents a positive sign in Models 1 and 3. The 
variable of the existence of a CSR committee (CSR_COMMITTEE) is positive and significant 
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in all six models, showing that these committees encourage CSR disclosure. Regarding 
industry, the healthcare variable (HEALTHCARE) is positive and is significant in Model 2, 
while the industrial variable (INDUSTRIALS) is also positive and significant in Models 1, 2, 
4, and 6. The basic materials variable (BASIC MATERIALS) offers a positive sign and is 
statistically significant in Model 1. The remaining variables are not statistically significant. 
<Insert Table 7> 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine how the existence of an audit committee, its 
independence, and its financial expertise affect CSR reporting. In addition, we explore the 
moderating effect of female directors on boards on the presence of an audit committee, non-
executive directors on audit committees, directors with financial experience on audit 
committees, and CSR reporting.  
Our evidence highlights how the existence of an audit committee affects CSR reporting. 
Specifically, the presence of an audit committee can guarantee the impartiality of financial 
reporting by disclosing CSR reporting to a greater extent. This view is also supported by Khan 
et al. (2013). Effective audit committees might encourage firms’ managers to engage in social 
and environmental activities by achieving higher CSR disclosure. Our results also suggest that 
key characteristics of audit committees are significantly associated with CSR disclosure. 
Specifically, audit committees with directors who have financial expertise positively affect 
CSR reporting. This evidence is consistent with stakeholder theory, which argues that directors 
with financial expertise on audit committees tend to balance financial and non-financial 
objectives as well as pressure managers to respond to stakeholder issues related to CSR 
disclosure (Helfaya and Moussa, 2017). Furthermore, this finding is in line with an agency 
perspective, which postulates that audit committees with directors who have financial expertise 
improve communication between parties and can enhance CSR reporting. Conversely, 
independent directors on audit committees discourage the disclosure of CSR information; the 
greater the proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees, the lower the extent of 
CSR disclosure. This could be explained by non-executive directors on audit committees 
playing an ineffective monitoring role concerning manager behavior, their decisions being 
limited by executive directors on audit committees, or their independence not being as real as 
expected. Our findings also show the moderating role played by female directors on boards 
regarding the association between audit committees and their attributes and CSR disclosure. 
Board gender diversity negatively moderates the positive effect of the presence of an audit 
committee in firms on CSR disclosure. Contrary to this evidence, female directors on boards 
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strengthen the positive association between directors with financial expertise on audit 
committees and CSR reporting by improving this disclosure. Further, they moderate the 
negative impact of non-executive directors on audit committees on CSR disclosure by 
mitigating this lower disclosure. Thus, these results suggest a relevant moderating role 
performed by women directors on boards when the relationship between audit committees and 
their attributes and CSR reporting is explored.  
Our evidence has several implications for policymakers, academics, companies, and 
stakeholders. For policymakers, these results suggest that audit committees can improve their 
supervisory functions, as they can increase the quality of financial information and the 
disclosure of CSR information. Thus, policymakers should consider the possibility of regulating 
the compulsory establishment of audit committees in all firms. Concerning audit committee 
composition, our findings can also help policymakers to reconsider the minimum number of 
non-executive directors required and the presence of directors with financial expertise, because 
these two kinds of directors affect CSR disclosure. While the presence of the former should be 
kept to a minimum, the proportion of the latter should be as high as possible—the higher the 
better. It is possible that the monitoring role of non-executive directors, as suggested by past 
research, is overestimated. Academics should extend our research by considering audit 
committee attributes other than non-executive directors and directors with financial expertise. 
Furthermore, researchers might explore the moderating effect of other board characteristics—
such as board size, board meetings, board independence, or CEO duality—on audit committees 
and their attributes and CSR disclosure. Finally, our evidence should be of interest to companies 
that do not consider the inclusion of non-executive directors in their audit committees, as their 
impact on CSR disclosure is negative. In this regard, companies should adopt different 
governance structures to adapt and adjust existing strategies to suit the rapid and drastic changes 
in the marketplace, stakeholders, and society. Moreover, managers engaging in CSR activities 
should consider establishing audit committees in their firms, if they are not already present. In 
addition, managers should take into account certain characteristics of audit committee structure, 
because not all directors positively affect CSR disclosure (such as non-executive directors). 
However, these effects on CSR reporting may change if boards have female representation. 
Therefore, managers should contemplate the optimal combination of audit committee members 
in firms, including non-executive directors and directors with financial expertise on audit 
committees, and women directors on boards.  
The main limitations of this study are summarized as follows. First, this paper is limited 
to listed non-financial companies due to the special accounting practices of financial 
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companies. Second, this paper considers two audit committee features supported by past 
research. More research addressing other audit committee characteristics will provide more 
evidence, which will enrich our findings.  
Finally, our study could be useful for future researchers interested in expanding the 
perspectives on audit committees. Further research could analyze the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on the disclosure of CSR information of non-listed companies or financial 
companies. Finally, future research could focus on the impact of other board sub-committees, 
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Country Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 817 6,20 6,20 
Austria 41 0,31 6,51 
Belgium 97 0,74 7,25 
Bermuda 15 0,11 7,36 
Brazil 257 1,95 9,31 
Canada 1155 8,76 18,08 
Chile 110 0,83 18,91 
China 342 2,60 21,51 
Czech Republic 8 0,06 21,57 
Denmark 115 0,87 22,44 
Egypt 22 0,17 22,61 
Finland 142 1,08 23,68 
France 578 4,39 28,07 
Germany 407 3,09 31,16 
Greece 10 0,08 31,23 
Hong Kong 128 0,97 32,21 
India 171 1,30 33,50 
Ireland 175 1,33 34,83 
Israel 19 0,14 34,97 
Italy 133 1,01 35,98 
Japan 1789 13,58 49,56 
Jersey 20 0,15 49,71 
Luxembourge 65 0,49 50,20 
Mexico 124 0,94 51,15 
Netherlands 220 1,67 52,82 
New Zealand 53 0,40 53,22 
Norway 70 0,53 53,75 
Portugal 29 0,22 53,97 
Russia 190 1,44 55,41 
South Africa 80 0,61 56,02 
Spain 211 1,60 57,62 
Sweden 261 1,98 59,60 
Switzerland 393 2,98 62,58 
Thailand 97 0,74 63,32 
United Kingdom 1209 9,17 72,49 
United States 3625 27,51 100 




Number of firms and observations by activity sector 
 






Basic Materials 1851 14,0 14,0 
Consumer Cyclicals 2484 18,8 32,9 
Consumer Non-cyclicals 1298 9,8 42,7 
Energy 1313 10,0 52,7 
Healthcare 1023 7,8 60,5 
Industrials 2816 21,4 81,8 
Technology 1032 7,8 89,7 
Telecommunications services 521 4,0 93,6 
Utilities 840 6,4 100,0 
Total 13,178 100,0  
 
Table 3 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure 
Environmental                                                              Social 
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CSR_SCORE The ratio between the aggregation of 112 items focused on social and environmental 
issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information 
concerning each item, it will take the value 1 and 0, otherwise 
AUD_COMT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee and 0, 
otherwise 
AUD_COMT_EXPERT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee with at least 
three members and at least one "financial expert" and 0, otherwise  
AUDI_COMT_NONEXE The proportion of non-executive members in audit committees calculated as the ratio 
between the total number of non-executive directors on audit committees and the total 
number of diretors on audit committees.  
SIZE The log of total assets 
ROA Operating income before interests and taxes over total assets 
LEV Debt over total assets 
B_SIZE Number of directors on board 
CSR_COMMITTEE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 
otherwise 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise 
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise 
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise 
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise 
UTILITIES Dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise 




































Mean and standard deviation. CSR_SCORE is measured as the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items focused on social and environmental 
issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 1 and 0, 
otherwise; AUD_COMT is measured as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee and 0, otherwise; 
AUD_COMT_EXPERT is calculated as the Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee with at least three 
members and at least one "financial expert" and 0, otherwise; AUDI_COMT_NONEXE is valued as the proportion of non-executive members 
in audit committees; SIZE is measured as the log of total assets; ROA is calculated as the operating income before interests and taxes over total 
assets; LEV is measured as the debt over total assets; B_SIZE is measured as the number of directors on board; CSR_COMMITTEE is noted 
as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the company 
operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, 
otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the 
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; 
INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector 
and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; 








Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
CSR_SCORE 13,178 0.252 0.160 
AUD_COMT 13,178 0.825 0.199 
AUD_COMT_EXPERT 13,178 0.720 0.450 
AUDI_COMT_NONEXE 13,178 0.921 0.833 
SIZE 13,178 9.643 1.478 
ROA 13,178 6.444 8.447 
LEV 13,178 14.085 8.056 
B_SIZE 13,178 10.898 3.562 
CSR_COMMITTEE 13,178 0.587 0.492 
BASIC MATERIALS 13,178 0.140 0.347 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 13,178 0.188 0.391 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
13,178 0.098 0.298 
ENERGY 13,178 0.099 0.299 
HEALTHCARE 13,178 0.078 0.268 
INDUSTRIALS 13,178 0.214 0.409 
TECHNOLOGY 13,178 0.078 0.269 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
13,178 0.040 0.195 
UTILITIES 13,178 0.064 0.244 
FEM_DIR_B 13,178 11.764 11.024 
 
 
Wald χ2 test 6196.71 *** 8639.01  *** 1328.85 *** 209.84 *** 262.75 *** 670.60 *** 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(1) (z, p>|z|) -2.73 (0.006) -2.81 (0.005) -3.31 (0.001) -2.59 (0.010) -3.10 (0.002) -3.93 (0.000) 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(2) (z, p>|z|) -1.06 (0.288) 0.57 (0.571) -1.08 (0.281) -1.52 (0.129) 1.13 (0.258) -1.17 (0.241) 
Hansen test (chi−square, p>|chi2|) 1.28 (0.200) 7.99 (0.715) 5.91 (0.994) 29.47 (0.000) 20.26 (0.000) 13.82 (0.129) 
 
Multivariate analysis results of the Generalised Method of Moments. CSR_SCORE is measured as the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items focused on social and environmental issues and the total number of items 
analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 1 and 0, otherwise; AUD_COMT is measured as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee 
and 0, otherwise; AUD_COMT_EXPERT is calculated as the Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee with at least three members and at least one "financial expert" and 0, otherwise; 
AUDI_COMT_NONEXE is valued as the proportion of non-executive members in audit committees; SIZE is measured as the log of total assets; ROA is calculated as the operating income before interests and taxes over 
total assets; LEV is measured as the debt over total assets; B_SIZE is measured as the number of directors on board; CSR_COMMITTEE is noted as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR 
committee, and 0 otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; 
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company 
operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR_B is the 




















































Matrix Correlations. CSR_SCORE is measured as the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items focused on social and environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information 
concerning each item, it will take the value 1 and 0, otherwise; AUD_COMT is measured as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee and 0, otherwise; AUD_COMT_EXPERT is 
calculated as the Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee with at least three members and at least one "financial expert" and 0, otherwise; AUDI_COMT_NONEXE is valued as the 
proportion of non-executive members in audit committees; SIZE is measured as the log of total assets; ROA is calculated as the operating income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is measured as the debt 
over total assets; B_SIZE is measured as the number of directors on board; CSR_COMMITTEE is noted as the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; BASIC 
MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS 
if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, 
otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the 
company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise; FEM_DIR_B is the proportion of female directors on boards. *p-
value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
CSR_SCORE (1) 
 
1.000                  
AUD_COMT (2) 
 
0.023*                  
AUD_COMT_EXPERT (3) 
 
0.038*** 0.333***                 
AUDI_COMT_NONEXE (4) 
 
-0.007 0.033*** 0.089***                
SIZE (5) 
 
0.520*** 0.007 -0.005 0.009               
ROA (6) 
 
-0.089*** 0.051*** 0.142*** -0.001 -0.199***              
LEV (7) 
 
0.140*** -0.013 -0.035*** 0.009 0.286*** -0.379***             
B_SIZE (8) 
 
0.329*** 0.042*** 0.012 0.032*** 0.502*** -
0.084**** 
0.173***            
CSR_COMMITTEE (9) 
 
0.619*** 0.013 0.051*** 0.001 0.290*** -0.131*** 0.102*** 0.186***           
BASIC MATERIALS (10) 
 
0.033*** 0.005 -0.039*** 0.015* -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.047*** -0.063*** 0.086***          
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL (11) 
 
0.073*** 0.009 0.015* 0.003 0.008 0.05*** 0.045*** 0.063*** 0.034*** -0.134***         
ENERGY (12) 
 
-0.041*** 0.039*** 0.056*** 0.005 0.094*** 0.044*** -0.097*** -0.015* 0.002 -0.135*** -0.110***        
INDUSTRIALS (13) 
 
0.006 -0.025** -0.086*** -0.019** 0.002 -0.081*** 0.130*** 0.038*** -0.012 -0.211*** -0.172*** -0.173***       
UTILITIES (14) 
 
0.057*** -0.004 0.018** 0.014 0.162*** -0.132*** 0.213*** 0.102*** 0.052*** -0.106*** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.136***      
CONSUMER CYCLICAL (15) 
 
-0.067*** -0.006 0.014* 0.015* -0.081*** 0.028** -0.032*** 0.015* -0.047*** -0.195*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.251*** -0.126***     
HEALTHCARE (16) 
 
-0.045*** -0.022*** 0.004 -0.026 -0.077*** 0.087*** -0.089*** -0.075*** -0.046*** -
0.1173*** 
-0.096*** -0.097*** -0.151*** -0.076*** -0.139***    
TECHNOLOGY (17) 0.002 0.004 0.043*** 0.014 -0.067*** 0.103*** -0.218*** -0.079*** -0.056*** 0.118*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.152*** -0.076*** -0.141*** -0.085   
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  (18) 
 
0.000 0.011 0.024* -0.032*** 0.104*** 0.009*** 0.112*** 0.073*** -0.012*** -0.082*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.106*** -0.053*** -0.098*** -0.059*** -0.059***  




Multivariate analysis results of the Generalised Method of Moments 
































  0.262*** 
(0.000) 
  




AUDI_COMT_NONEXE   -0.005* (0.060) 



































































































































































FEM_DIR_B x AUD_COMT    -0.027*** (0.009)   
FEM_DIR_B x AUD_COMT_EXPERT     0.007** (0.013)  
FEM_DIR_B x AUDI_COMT_NONEXE      0.001*** (0.000) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
